Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American and Western European countries. Such institutional and organizational differences might shape firms operational environment in general and the type of competition in product and labor markets in particular. Contributing to the literature on estimating simultaneously product and labor market imperfections, this paper quantifies industry differences in both types of imperfections using firm-level data in Chile, a non-OECD member under the considered time period, and France. We rely on two extensions of Hall's econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins by nesting three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining and monopsony). Using an unbalanced panel of 1,737 firms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile containing unique data on firm-level output price indices and 14,270 firms over the period 1994-2001 in France, we first classify 20 comparable manufacturing industries in 6 distinct regimes that differ in the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. We then investigate industry differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfections. Consistent with differences in institutions and in the industrial relations system in the two countries, we find important regime differences across the two countries. In addition, we observe cross-country differences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections within regimes.
Introduction
There is an abundant literature on production function estimation studying how …rms convert inputs into outputs and the e¢ ciency with which this occurs (see Syverson, 2011 for a survey). This literature as of late has given increasing attention to possible biases that market imperfections -particularly in the product market-could induce in production function and productivity estimates. There is a long tradition in applied industrial organization of estimating product market power (see De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012 for references). While most economists believe that product and labor market imperfections almost surely exist to one degree or another, only few have explicitly accounted for their joint in ‡uence on production function estimation at the micro level and existing analyses have been con…ned to OECD countries (see Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013 for references).
Contributing to the econometric literature on estimating simultaneously product market and labor market imperfections, this paper aims at identifying and quantifying industry di¤erences in both types of imperfections in Chile -a non-OECD member under the considered time period 1 -and France. In particular, we …rst examine cross-country variation in the prevalence of regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. We then investigate cross-industry heterogeneity in the degree of product and labor market imperfections within regimes. Relying on an econometric method that only requires …rm-level data on production values, factor inputs and factor costs proves particularly useful to analyze important labor issues in a comparative setting. For example, our analysis allows to distinguish industries predominantly characterized by wage determination under trade unions from those predominantly typi…ed by wage determination under oligopsonistic competition. As such, our analysis is capable of discerning whether either market power on the supply side or market power on the demand side is predominantly responsible for introducing allocative ine¢ ciencies through distorting factor prices.
The Chilean-French comparison is motivated by the inherent institutional, organizational and cultural differences between the two countries. As part of the OECD accession process, competition law has been strengthened and regulatory policies -aimed at fostering market openness and competition-have been implemented in accordance with the OECD's Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance (2005) in Chile during the last three decades (OECD, 2010). However, di¤erences remain in the regulatory settings in Chile and France that our comparative study may con…rm. For example, the OECD indicators of product market anti-competitive regulations show that regulations are higher in Chile, in particular as concerns administrative regulation which su¤ers from opacity and imposes burdens on startups (Wöl ‡ et al., 2010) . In Chile, social strati…cation and legislation -tracing back to di¤erences based on race, social status and ownership established during colonial times-have historically modelled industrial relations and continue to shape largely today's Chilean industrial relations system. Labor reforms, implemented during the 1990s, have not been su¢ cient to move away from the legacy of dictatorship (Durán-Palma et al., 2005) . Labor legislation continues to facilitate dismissal, unionization remains contested and employment relations are still based on authority, thereby promoting worker fear and insecurity (Rodríguez, 2010; Ronconi, 2012) . Indeed, comparing Chile to France, the OECD indicators of employment protection indicate that employment protection is signi…cantly higher in France, which is due to much stricter regulation on temporary contracts and to additional requirements for collective dismissals (Venn, 2009 ). The industrial relations system in Chile also explains why only 14% of employees are union members and only 24% of employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements, which are mostly concluded at the enterprise level. In terms of union membership, the French trade union movement is among the weakest in Europe, with an even lower proportion of employees in unions than in Chile (8%). French trade unions are divided into a number of rival confederations, competing for membership. However, union membership is not the only indicator of strength. Despite low membership and apparent division, French trade unions have repeatedly shown that they are able to mobilize workers in mass strikes and demonstrations to great e¤ect. In France, negotiations are mostly held at the industry level which can be supplemented with bargaining agreements at the …rm level. The fact that the government often extends the terms of industry-level agreements to all employers explains the very high collective bargaining coverage (95%). These institutional and organizational di¤erences might shape …rms'operational environment in general and -within our context-the type of competition in product and labor markets in particular. For example, given that industrial relations in France are characterized by a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining typi…ed by the dominance of industry-level wage bargaining and the existence and widespread use of extension procedures for industry-level wage agreements and that French trade unions have shown to be powerful, we expect the proportion of industries typi…ed by wage determination under trade unions to be larger in France compared to Chile.
Methodologically, our study implements the classi…cation procedure developed in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) . This procedure is based on two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's (1988) framework for estimating price-cost margins that take into account two polar extremes of types of imperfections in the labor market that are both intuitively appealing and tractable: the e¢ cient bargaining model (McDonald and Solow, 1981) -being one of the two canonical rent-sharing models -that allocates market power to employees through costs of …ring, hiring and training, and the monopsony model (Manning, 2003 ) that allocates market power to employers through search frictions or heterogeneous worker preferences for job characteristics which generate upward sloping labor supply curves to individual …rms (Booth, 2014) . This classi…cation procedure uses econometric production functions as a tool for testing the competitiveness of product and labor markets and evaluating their degree of imperfection. By considering two product market settings (perfect competition (P C) and imperfect competition (IC)) and three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (P R), Nickell and Andrews, 1983, e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and monopsony (M O)), it distinguishes six regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets.
Given the selection of our two countries, our analysis is related to Benavente et al. (2009) , Dobbelaere et al. (2015) and Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) . These studies are also based on the gap methodology which essentially starts from the observation that any factors that create misallocation of resources can be thought of as generating wedges in the …rst-order conditions of …rm optimization problems. Using a sample of manufacturing …rms in Belgium, Chile and France, Benavente et al. (2009) impose e¢ cient bargaining on the data and estimate a Solow residual equation that gives estimates of average price-cost mark-up and rent-sharing parameters at the manufacturing level. Using a sample of manufacturing …rms in France, Japan and the Netherlands, Dobbelaere et al. (2015) apply two distinct classi…cation procedures -which deviate from the one in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013)-to investigate di¤erences in revealed product and labor market settings at the industry level and to check the sensitivity of these settings to the choice of estimator. Using a sample of manufacturing plants in Chile, Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) estimate the gaps between an input's marginal product and its cost to infer the value of lost output arising from allocative e¢ ciency at the manufacturing level. Our contribution di¤ers from the aforementioned analyses in two respects. First, our study is the …rst to consistently compare the type and the degree of industry-level product and labor market imperfections inferred from consistent estimation of …rm-level production functions in a Latin American country and a Western European country. Second, using a unique dataset containing …rm-level output price indices, our microeconomic production function estimates for Chile are not subject to the omitted output price bias, as is often a major drawback in microeconometric studies of …rm behavior.
Our empirical analysis is based on two unbalanced panels of manufacturing …rms: 1,737 …rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 …rms over the period 1994-2001 in France. Our analysis consists of two parts. In the …rst part, we classify 20 comparable manufacturing industries in each country according to the six distinct regimes prevailing in these industries. We observe considerable di¤erences in the prevalent product and labor market settings and hence in the competitiveness regimes in the 20 industries. We …nd that imperfect competition in the product market is much more frequent in both countries than perfect competition and more so in France than in Chile, and that the most prevalent labor market setting is perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in Chile while it is e¢ cient bargaining in France. In the second part, we investigate within-regime industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters in each country. In addition to the important cross-country regime di¤erences that our analysis reveals, we also …nd di¤erences in the levels of market imperfections within these two regimes.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the …rm panel data for Chile and France. Section 4 discusses the estimation method and the econometric implementation of our procedure to classify industries in distinct regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. Section 5 reports the results of the classi…cation procedure, investigating how industries in both countries di¤er in the nature of product and labor market imperfections and assesses industry di¤erences in the degree of market imperfections within each regime. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical framework
This section presents the main ingredients of our extension of Hall's (1988) framework for estimating pricecost margins, which does not assume perfect competition in the labor market but considers three labor market settings: perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony. For technical details, we refer to Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013).
We start from a production function Q it = it F (N it ; M it ; K it ),where i is a …rm index, t a time index, N is labor, M is material input and K is capital. it = Ae i +ut+ it , with i an unobserved …rm-speci…c e¤ect, u t a year-speci…c intercept and it a random component, is an index of technical change or "true" total factor productivity. Denoting the logarithm of Q it , N it , M it , K it and it by q it , n it , m it , k it and it respectively, the logarithmic speci…cation of the production function gives:
where (" Q J ) it (J = N; M; K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J.
Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC). We allow for three labor market settings (LM S): perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (P R), e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and monopsony (M O). 2 We assume that material input and labor are variable factors. Short-run pro…t maximization implies the following …rst-order condition with respect to material input:
where ( M ) it = jitMit PitQit is the share of material costs in total revenue and it = Pit
refers to the mark-up of output price P it over marginal cost (C Q ) it . Eq. (2) shows that the price-cost mark-up generates a wedge between the output elasticity of materials and the revenue share of materials.
Depending on the prevalent LM S, short-run pro…t maximization implies the following …rst-order condition with respect to labor:
where ( N ) it = witNit PitQit is the share of labor costs in total revenue. it = it 1 it represents the relative extent of rent sharing, it 2 [0; 1] the absolute extent of rent sharing, it = (" N w )it 1+(" N w )it and (" N w ) it 2 < + the wage elasticity of the labor supply. From the …rst-order conditions with respect to material input and labor, we can de…ne a parameter of joint market imperfections ( it ) that is zero, positive or negative depending on the labor market setting:
Eq. (6) clearly shows that our framework is based on the gap methodology. Indeed, from Eq. (6), it follows that the gap between the output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares are key to identi…cation of the product and labor market imperfection parameters. Intuitively, in a perfectly competitive labor market or in a right-to-manage bargaining setting, the marginal employee receives a real wage that equals his/her marginal product. As such, the only source of discrepancy between the output elasticity of labor and the share of labor costs in revenue is the price-cost mark-up, just like in the materials market, yielding the value zero of the joint market imperfections parameter. In an e¢ cient bargaining setting, the marginal employee gets a real wage that exceeds his/her marginal product since e¢ cient bargaining allocates inframarginal gains across employees, yielding the positive value of the joint market imperfections parameter. In a monopsony setting, on the other hand, the marginal employee obtains a real wage that is less than his/her marginal product, yielding the negative value of the joint market imperfections parameter.
Once the relevant labor market setting is determined, the product and labor market imperfections parameters are derived from the joint market imperfections parameter ( it ): the price-cost mark-up and extent of rentsharing parameters ( it and it , respectively) if the e¢ cient bargaining model prevails (see Eq. (8)) or the price-cost mark-up and labor supply elasticity parameters it and (" N w ) it , respectively if the monopsony model prevails (see Eq. (9)). On the product market side, the price-cost mark-up measures the ability of …rms to charge prices above marginal costs. On the labor market side, the absolute extent of rent-sharing parameter ( it which is directly derived from it ) measures the part of economic rents going to the workers or the degree of workers'bargaining power during worker-…rm negotiations whereas the labor supply elasticity parameter measures the degree of wage setting power that …rms possess.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
Inserting Eqs. (2), (6) and (10) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives:
Eq. (11) is the basis for the empirical estimation of our parameters of interest.
Data description
Our modi…ed production function framework only requires data on production values, factor inputs and factor costs. This section presents the micro data in Chile and France.
The Chilean data are sourced from the ENIA ("Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual") survey collected annually by INE ("Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas"). The French data are based on …rm accounting information from EAE ("Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise", "Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles" (SESSI)). For both countries, our estimation sample is restricted to …rms having at least four consecutive observations. After some trimming on input shares in total revenue and input growth rates to eliminate outliers and anomalies, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 1,737 …rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile (CH) and 14,270 …rms spanning the period 1994-2001 in France (F R). Output (Q) is de…ned as nominal sales divided by a …rm-level price index based on the product-…rm level annex from ENIA in CH and current production de ‡ated by the two-digit producer price index in F R. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and quartile values of our main variables by country. The average growth rate of real …rm output is -0.4% per year in CH and 3.2% in F R. 3 In CH, labor and materials have decreased at an average annual growth rate of 1.8% and 1.9% respectively, while capital has increased at an average annual growth rate of 4.3%. In F R, labor and materials have increased at an average annual growth rate of 1.2% and 4.2% respectively, whereas capital has decreased at an average annual growth rate of 0.2%. The Solow residual or the conventional measure of total factor productivity (T F P ) has been stable over the considered period in each country. As expected for …rm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is considerably large. For example, T F P growth is lower than -11.1% (-5.0%) for the …rst quartile of …rms in CH (F R) and higher than 10.0% (6.3%) for the upper quartile in CH (F R).
<Insert Table 1 about here> 4 Econometric framework
Estimation method
We use econometric production functions as a tool for testing the competitiveness of product and labor markets and for assessing their degree of imperfection, not only for estimating factor elasticities and total factor productivity as has been common practice in the econometric literature on estimating microeconomic production functions.
Since our study aims at (i) comparing regime di¤erences in terms of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets across CH and F R and (ii) assessing within-regime industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters in each country, we estimate average parameters:
with it = ! it + it . Of the error components, ! it represents unobserved productivity to the econometrician but possible observed by the …rm at t when input decisions are made (transmitted productivity shock), while it captures all other sources of error or productivity that is not observed by the …rm before making input choices at t. Our method of retrieving product and labor market imperfection parameters from the gap between the estimated average output elasticities of labor and materials and their average revenue shares 3 The negative average real …rm output growth rate in CH is due to a …nancial crisis that hit the Chilean manufacturing industries in 1998 and 1999. Real …rm output decreased at an average growth rate of 2.1% and 7.3% in 1998 and 1999 respectively. Taking out the crisis years would yield an average growth rate of real …rm output of 1.5% per year.
allows to wash out …rm-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are temporary in nature, i.e. related to the business cycle.
The recent literature on production function estimation is dominated by two econometric approaches that di¤er in handling endogeneity of inputs and unobserved productivity in models linear in parameters. Intuitively, both approaches di¤er in the way they put assumptions on the economic environment that allow econometricians to exploit lagged input decisions as instruments for current input choices. The parametric generalized method of moments (GMM ) approach relies on instrumental variables (IV ). The semiparametric structural control function (CF ) approach uses observed variables and economic theory to invert out productivity nonparametrically and hence to obtain an observable expression for productivity. 4 Since we are primarily interested in retrieving consistent production function coe¢ cients based on two di¤erent micro datasets rather than an accurate measure of productivity, we judge the parametric GMM approach to be the most appropriate.
In particular, we rely on a general approach to estimating error components models designed for panels with few time periods and many individuals, covariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (SYS-GMM estimator). This approach extends the standard (…rst-di¤ erenced) GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) -which eliminates unobserved …rm-speci…c e¤ects by taking …rst di¤erences-by relying on a richer set of orthogonal conditions. 5 The error components are an unobserved …xed e¤ect ( i ), a possibly autoregressive productivity shock (! it = ! it 1 + it with j j < 1) and serially uncorrelated measurement errors ( it ), with it ; it i:i:d. Consistent with our static theoretical framework, we estimate the restricted version of the Blundell-Bond model and only consider idiosyncratic productivity shocks (imposing = 0). We apply the two-step GMM estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient than the one-step GMM estimator and which is robust to whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity and crosscorrelation. We use a …nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) . The validity of GMM crucially hinges on the assumption that the instruments are exogenous. We report both the Sargan and Hansen test statistics for the joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions. We build sets of instruments following the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)-approach which avoids the standard two-stage least squares trade-o¤ between instrument lag depth and sample depth by including separate instruments for each time period and substituting zeros for missing observations. However, the SYS-GMM estimator might generate moment conditions proli…cally with the instrument count quadratic in the time dimension of the panel. To avoid instrument proliferation, we only use 2-and 3-year lags of the instrumented variables as instruments in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year lag of the …rst-di¤erenced instrumented variables as instruments in the original equation. In addition to the Hansen test evaluating the entire set of overidentifying restrictions/instruments, we provide di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics to test the validity of subsets of instruments.
Besides the simultaneity bias, other important biases that emerge when estimating microeconomic production functions are (i) the output price bias, (ii) the bias arising from the unobserved allocation of inputs across products within multi-product …rms and (iii) the bias arising from unobserved input prices with the source of input price variation across …rms being quality di¤erentiation (referred to as the input price bias) (De Loecker et al., 2012). 6 If …rms face downward-sloping demands, a negative correlation might arise between …rm-level price deviations (from an average price index) and input choices. As a result, the output price bias could produce downwardly biased output elasticity estimates. As shown by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014), controlling for output price variation but ignoring input price variation could lead to downwardly biased (or even negative) output elasticity estimates. As the output price bias and the input price bias tend to work in opposite directions, not controlling for either output price or input price variation produces less biased output elasticity estimates. Realizing that our data comprise a set of industries characterized by substantial product di¤erentiation and acknowledging that di¤erentiated products require di¤erentiated inputs, we ideally need to control for both output price and input price variation. Having information on …rm-level output prices but lacking information on …rm-level input prices for CH, hence, estimating a quantity production function that ignores input price variation, our output elasticity estimates could be downwardly biased. Lacking information on …rm-level output prices and input prices for F R, our output elasticity estimates su¤er from both the output price bias and the input price bias, with the net bias likely to be small.
In addition to the biases discussed so far, the presence of adjustment costs in inputs could also be a source of bias in our estimates. In particular, assuming that labor and materials are variable input factors free of adjustment costs (i.e. decided at production time when the productivity component ! it is observed by the …rm, but not by the econometrician) could generate an upward bias in the respective production function coe¢ cients. However, by estimating average production function coe¢ cients, we argue that this e¤ect should be limited. Note that although our estimation method might wash out …rm-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are temporary in nature, country-and industry-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are permanent/structural in nature might still remain.
Classi…cation procedure
In each country, we consider 20 comparable industries making up our estimation sample. This decomposition is detailed enough for our purpose and ensures that each industry contains a su¢ cient number of observations (minimum: 104 observations for Other food products in CH and 929 for Rubber products in F R). Table  A The sign and statistical signi…cance of the estimated industry-speci…c joint market imperfections parameter b j determines the regime characterizing the type of competition prevailing in the product and the labor market. A priori, 6 distinct regimes are possible: (1 ) perfect competition in the product market (P C) and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (P R), (2 ) imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (P R), (3 ) perfect competition in the product market (P C) and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (EB), (4 ) imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (EB), (5 ) perfect competition in the product market (P C) and monopsony in the labor market (M O) and (6 ) imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and monopsony in the labor market (M O). We denote the 6 possible regimes by R 2 < = fP C-P R; IC-P R; P C-EB; IC-EB; P C-M O; IC-M Og.
We apply the classi…cation procedure introduced in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) to classify our manufacturing industries in R 2 <. This classi…cation procedure consists of two stages. In the …rst stage, we perform an F -test (explicit joint test) of the joint hypothesis H 0 :
where the alternative is that at least one of the parameters (the industry-speci…c price-cost mark-up j minus 1, or the industry-speci…c joint market imperfections parameter j ) does not equal zero. In other words, if H 0 is not rejected, that particular industry is characterized by the P C-P R-regime and if H 0 is rejected, it is not. Having selected the industries typi…ed by the P C-P R-regime, we classify in the second stage of the procedure the remaining industries in one of the …ve other regimes by conducting two separate t-tests.
For example, if our null hypothesis is IC-EB, we perform the following implicit joint test (or induced test) (Savin, 1984) : H 10 : j 1 > 0 and H 20 : j > 0. The separate t-tests reject that the IC-EB-regime applies if either H 10 or H 20 is rejected. Since it is generally accepted that market imperfections are the norm, not the exception, we put a priori less weight on the P C-P R-regime by using the 10% statistical signi…cance level instead of the conventional 5% level. More speci…cally, when testing H 0 : j 1 = j = 0 in the …rst stage of the classi…cation procedure, we reject H 0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed p-value is less than 0.10. When testing H 10 : j 1 = 0 against H 1a : j 1 > 0 in the second stage of the classi…cation procedure, we reject H 10 at the 10% level if j 1 > 0, i.e. corresponding to a two-tailed p-value less than 0.20. Likewise, for the test of j > 0 or j < 0, we reject H 20 : j = 0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed p-value is less than 0.10.
Di¤erences in the nature and the degree of market imperfections
Recall that the purpose of our study is twofold. First, analyzing whether there exist di¤erences in regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets between CH and F R and checking whether our methodology allows to capture country-level di¤erences in terms of institutions and the industrial relations system. This analysis is performed by implementing our classi…cation procedure whose results are discussed in Section 5.1. Second, examining within-regime industry di¤erences by (i) checking whether the observed cross-country regime di¤erences are driven by important cross-country di¤erences in the composition of industries making up the regime and (ii) investigating cross-industry heterogeneity in the degree of product and labor market imperfections within regimes. These results are discussed in Section 5.2. As such, Section 5.1 and the …rst part of Section 5.2 focuses on a cross-country comparison whilst the remainder of Section 5.2 has a cross-industry focus. Table 2 summarizes the resulting industry classi…cation. 7 Columns 5 (CH) and 8 (F R) in Table A <Insert Table 2 
Prevalent regimes

about here>
Summing up, our methodology allows to capture -to some extent-country-level institutional di¤erences in terms of regulatory policy and the industrial relations system, which are structural in nature. We …nd that (i) imperfect competition in the product market is much more frequent in both countries than perfect competition and more so in F R than in CH and (ii) the most prevalent labor market setting is perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in CH and e¢ cient bargaining in F R. As such, the dominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market in CH and one of imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market in F R. 8 
Within-regime industry di¤erences
Are the cross-country regime di¤erences that we con…rmed in the previous section driven by cross-country di¤erences in the composition of industries making up the regimes? To answer that question, we compare the relevant regime of each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 20g across both countries (see columns 5 and 8 in Table A So far, we have concentrated on the identi…cation of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. As the degree of market failures is likely to vary across countries and across industries, we now focus on the quanti…cation of market power in product and labor markets. This enables us to evaluate to which degree actual product and labor markets deviate from their perfectly competitive or economically e¢ cient counterparts. From Section 2, it is clear that once the regime is determined, the product and labor market imperfections parameters are derived from the estimated joint market imperfections parameter b j . Table 3 presents the industry mean and the industry quartile values of the SYS-GMM results within the prevalent regimes in each country. The left part of Table 3 reports the estimated joint market imperfections parameter and the right part the relevant product and labor market imperfection parameters, i.e. the price-cost markup within P C-P R and IC-P R, and the price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing within IC-EB. The standard errors ( ) of b j , b j and b j are computed using the Delta method (Wooldridge, 2002) . 9 All industry-speci…c estimates are presented in Table A .3 in Appendix. In addition to the parameters reported in Table 3 , Table A .3 also reports the computed factor shares and the output elasticity estimates. In Table  A .3, industries within the P C-P R-and IC-P R-regimes are ranked according to b j and industries within the IC-EB-regime according to b j .
Let us focus the discussion on the primary parameters within each regime in CH and F R respectively. The prevalent regimes in CH are IC-P R (40% of industries/34% of …rms), P C-P R (40% of industries/12% of …rms) and IC-EB (20% of industries/53% of …rms).
Within regime R = IC-P R in CH, b j is lower than 1.199 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.592 for industries in the upper quartile. The median value of b j is estimated at 1.397.
Within regime R = P C-P R in CH, b j is lower than 1.007 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.329 for industries in the third quartile. The median value of b j is estimated at 1.198.
Within R = IC-EB in CH, b j is lower than 0.800 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.115 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1.403 for the …rst quartile 9 Dropping subscript j, b , b and b are derived as follows:
Their respective standard errors are computed as:
of industries and higher than 1.633 for the top quartile. The corresponding b j is estimated to be lower than 0.237 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.306 for industries in the upper quartile. The median values of b j , b j and b j are estimated at 0.904, 1.543 and 0.287 respectively.
The prevalent regimes in F R are IC-EB (60% of industries/73% of …rms) and IC-P R (40% of industries/27% of …rms).
Within R = IC-EB in F R, b j is lower than 0.473 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.712 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding b j is lower than 1.344 for the …rst quartile of industries and higher than 1.471 for the top quartile. The corresponding b j is estimated to be lower than 0.383 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 0.489 for industries in the upper quartile.
The median values of b j , b j and b j are estimated at 0.651, 1.378 and 0.431 respectively.
Within regime R = IC-P R in F R, b j is lower than 1.244 for industries in the …rst quartile and higher than 1.427 for industries in the upper quartile. The median value of b j is estimated at 1.306.
<Insert Table 3 
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Given that we have provided evidence of compositional variation in regimes across countries, we expect a priori to observe di¤erences in the degree of market imperfection parameters across countries within a particular regime. Con…rming this expectation for the IC-EB-regime, the median price-cost mark-up is estimated to be signi…cantly higher in CH (1.543 compared to 1.378 in F R) whilst the median absolute extent of rent sharing is estimated to be signi…cantly higher in F R (0.431 compared to 0.287 in CH). However, we do not detect a statistically signi…cant cross-country di¤erence in the median product imperfection parameter within the IC-P R-regime.
Existing empirical studies -relying on either the same or a simpli…ed version of our theoretical modelhave found that product and labor market imperfections are likely to go hand in hand by documenting a positive correlation between the estimated price-cost mark-up and the estimated extent of rent sharing in the cross-section dimension (see Dobbelaere, 2004; Boulhol et al., 2011 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013) . Corroborative evidence is provided by several OECD studies indicating that (i) there is a positive correlation between product market regulation and industry wage mark-ups (OECD, 2001) and (ii) product and labor market deregulations are correlated across countries (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005) . Supporting evidence is also given by Ebell and Haefke (2006) who argue that the strong decline in coverage and unionization in the UK and the US might have been a direct consequence of product market reforms of the early 1980s and by Boulhol (2009) who develops a theoretical model formalizing the idea that trade and capital market liberalization put pressure on labor market institutions leading to deregulation. Do we observe any relationship between product and labor imperfections in the two countries under consideration? To get a …rst insight, Table A .4 in Appendix reports correlations between product and labor market imperfection parameters for all industries and for the IC-EB-regime in each of the two countries. Two types of correlations between b j and b j / b j and b j are reported: Spearman's rank correlation coe¢ cients and biweight midcorrelation coe¢ cients. The latter, which is based on Wilcox (2005) , gives a correlation that is less sensitive to outliers and therefore more robust. Considering all industries, we observe a signi…cant and strong correlation (of more than 0.6) between either b j and b j or b j and b j in both CH and F R. This holds for both types of correlation coe¢ cients. Within the IC-EB-regime, we …nd a signi…cant robust correlation of 0.48 (0.77) between b j and b j in CH (F R). A visual representation is given in Graphs 1-2. Each graph corresponds to one country. The …rst two panels in each graph focus on all industries, whereas the last panel in each graph focuses on the IC-EB-regime. The dashed lines denote the median values of the product and labor market imperfection parameters.
<Insert Graphs 1-2 about here>
Conclusion
This paper starts from the belief that product and labor markets are intrinsically characterized by imperfections and by the fact that variable input factors'estimated marginal products are not equal to their measured payments. There are a number of reasons why the latter discrepancy could exist. Paramount among these are economic factors like imperfections in product and/or factor markets, variable factor utilization, factor adjustment costs and measurement issues. Focusing on the former, this paper investigates how di¤erent manufacturing industries in Chile and France are in their factor shares, in their marginal products and in their imperfections in the product and labor markets in which they operate. Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony), we rely on two extensions of Hall's econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins. Using an unbalanced panel of 1,737 …rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 …rms over the period 1994-2001 in France, we …rst determine the prevalent product market and labor market settings, and hence the prevalent regime, in 20 comparable manufacturing industries. We then investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters within the prevalent regimes in each country.
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American countries and Western European countries. In Chile, practices continue to favor employers as evidenced by the easiness with which employers can hire or dismiss employees and by employers' decision-making power during the process of collective bargaining, and unionization remains contested. In contrast, industrial relations in France are characterized by a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining typi…ed by the dominance of industrylevel wage bargaining and the widespread use of extension procedures for industry-level wage agreements. These di¤erences in the industrial relations system in the two countries are re ‡ected in our results. Indeed, our analysis provides evidence of important regime di¤erences at the detailed industry level across Chile and France. The dominant regime in Chile is one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (IC-P R). The median price-cost mark-up in the IC-P R-industries is about 1.40. In France, the dominant regime is imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB). The median price-cost mark-up and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters in the IC-EB-industries are about 1.38 and 0.43 respectively. Our study also reveals cross-country di¤erences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections within regimes. Within the IC-EB-regime, product market imperfections are estimated to be the highest in Chile while labor market imperfections are estimated to the highest in France.
The main message of our results is that despite the implementation of regulatory policies aimed at increasing competition in Chile and France, actual product and labor markets still deviate considerably from their economically e¢ cient counterparts. Given that the recent misallocation literature has now well established the important role of misallocation of resources across productive units in explaining aggregate outcomes, this …nding together with our evidence of cross-country cross-industry heterogeneity in terms of allocative e¢ ciency might explain to some extent the sizeable variation in total factor productivity across our two countries and selected industries. Regime R = IC-EB [20% of industries, 53% of …rms] 
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